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The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest
U.S. and EU Multinationals
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH* AND YARON LAHAV**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has the second highest statutory corporate tax
rate in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) (after Japan).' This has not always been the case. Af-
ter the Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the U.S. rate from 46% to
34%,2 the United States had one of the lowest statutory corporate tax
rates in the OECD. 3 In the past twenty-five years, however, the U.S.
rate has remained essentially unchanged (it was raised to 35% in
1993),4 while most other OECD countries reduced their statutory rate
so that the OECD average statutory corporate tax rate is 25.1%. 5
Not surprisingly, this situation has led to numerous calls for lower-
ing the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate, on the grounds that it is mak-
ing U.S.-based multinationals uncompetitive vis-A-vis their
counterparts in other OECD countries.6 Recently, even the Obama
Administration, following the lead of some Democrats in Congress,
has supported lowering the corporate tax rate.7 The current debate is
less about whether the corporate rate should be lowered and more
about whether such a reform should be revenue neutral, that is, paid
for by eliminating corporate tax expenditures such as deferral, accel-
erated depreciation, and the tax credit for domestic production.8
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan.
** Lecturer in Business Administration, Ben Gurion University of the Negev.
OECD, Tax Database, tbl.II.1, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase (last visited Feb. 7,
2012).
2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2249.
3 OECD, note 1, at tbl.II.1.
4 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13221, 107 Stat. 312, 477.
5 OECD, note 1, tbl.1I.1.
6 See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Tax Found., Fiscal Fact No. 136: U.S. Corporate Taxes Now
50% Higher Than OECD Average 1 (2008), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/
files/ff136.pdf ("The long-term prospects of the U.S. economy are at risk as long as our
corporate tax rate remains out of step with the rest of the world.").
7 Ryan J. Donmoyer & Peter Cohn, Obama Backs Corporate Rate Cut Along with Tax
Simplification, Bloomberg.com (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-
26/Obama-backs-cut-in-u-s-corporate-tax-rate-only-if-it-won-t-affect-deficit.htm.
8 See, e.g., Comm. for Responsible Federal Budget, Yes, Actually, We Can (at the Very
Least) Make Corporate Tax Reform Revenue Neutral (Nov. 7, 2011), http://crfb.org/blogs/
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At the same time, however, there have been a plethora of conflict-
ing claims about the effective tax rate (ETR) borne by U.S.-based
multinationals. Some have stated that like the statutory rate, it is
among the highest in the OECD,9 while others have claimed that it is
among the lowest.10 This debate is important because it is the effec-
tive corporate tax rate and not the statutory rate that most directly
affects the competitiveness of U.S.-based multinationals against mul-
tinationals based in other OECD jurisdictions.
Neither side, however, has data to support its claims. Almost all
existing studies of the ETR on U.S.-based multinationals focus only
on those companies, and do not attempt to compare them with mul-
tinationals based in other countries." The only exception is a recent
yes-actually-we-can-very-least-make-corporate-tax-reform-revenue-neutral ("[R]eaching a
target like 25 percent will require essentially wiping out all the tax expenditures on the
corporate side of the code."); Meg Shreve, Businesses Oppose Revenue-Neutral Corporate
Tax Reform, CEO Tells Ways and Means, Tax.com (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.tax.com/
taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/FCC694AF03D1 F76985257822003D209A?OpenDocument
(describing how some U.S. business leaders wanted reduction in corporate rates without
base offsets).
9 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Large U.S. Firms' Effective Tax Rates Surpass OECD Aver-
age, Survey Says (Apr. 14, 2011), 2011 TNT 73-3, Apr. 15, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax
Analysts File (stating effective U.S. corporate rate for multinationals is higher than other
OECD countries); Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y
Research, Report Card on Effective Corporate Tax Rates: United States Gets an F, Tax
Pol'y Outlook, Feb. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/09/TPO-2011-
01-g.pdf (same).
10 See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice, Analysis: 12 Corporations Pay Effective Tax Rate
of Negative 1.5% on $171 Billion in Profits; Reap $62.4 Billion in Tax Subsidies: Exxon
Mobil, Boeing, Verizon, Others Illustrate Why Revenue Raising Reform Is Needed 2
(2011), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/12corps060111.pdf (finding that the highest ETR
of twelve Fortune 500 Corporations was 14.2% for 2008-2010); Citizens for Tax Justice,
U.S. Is One of the Least Taxed Developed Countries: Revenue Increase the Obvious An-
swer to Deficit Impasse 2 (2011), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/oecd201106.pdf (stat-
ing some U.S. corporations have a far lower ETR than foreign competitors because of
aggressive tax strategies); David Kocieniewski, U.S. Business Has High Tax Rates, Techni-
cally, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2011, at Al (same); Chuck Marr & Brian Highsmith, Ctr. on
Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Six Tests for Corporate Tax Reform: Reform Should Help
Shrink Long-Term Deficits, Reduce Biases and Preferences in the Tax Code, and Discour-
age Tax Sheltering 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/Files/2-28-1Itax.pdf ("[T]he
U.S. collects less corporate taxes as a share of GDP than all but one of the 26 OECD
countries .... ").
11 See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the
Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 7 Fla.
Tax Rev. 153, 155 (2005) (limiting analysis to U.S. multinationals); Scott D. Dryeng &
Bradley P. Lindsey, Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign
Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on U.S. Multinational Firms' Tax
Rates, 47 J. Acct. Res. 1283, 1284-85 (2009) (same); George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do
Large Public Corporations Pay? Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 Va.
L. Rev 1793, 1795 (2003) (limiting analysis to S&P 500 corporations); Harry Grubert, For-
eign Taxes, Domestic Income, and the Jump in the Share of Multinational Income Abroad:
Sales Aren't Being Globalized, Only Profits 1 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax'n, Working
Paper No. 09/26, 2009), available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/Documents/work-
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study commissioned by the Business Roundtable and executed by
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 12 As discussed below, however, this study
suffers from numerous flaws, the most important of which is that it
includes two thousand companies from fifty-eight foreign countries
and, therefore, has many companies that are not serious competitors
of large U.S.-based multinationals (for example, companies based in
Morocco, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Oman).13
The competitiveness issue is primarily about the ability of the larg-
est U.S. multinationals to compete with their counterparts based in
other countries, and especially those based in the European Union
(since Japanese multinationals are known to be subject to higher stat-
utory and effective tax rates than U.S. ones, and therefore, they are
less relevant to this debate).1 4 We therefore decided to study the
overall ETRs of the largest 100 U.S.-based multinationals over the
past decade, and compare them with the ETRs of the largest 100 EU-
based multinationals. In our opinion, this is the comparison that is
most relevant to resolving the competitiveness issue, because (1) it
focuses only on large multinationals in the most relevant jurisdic-
tions,15 and (2) it focuses on the overall ETR borne by each group of
multinationals, and not on other issues such as the statutory tax rate,
the ETR on foreign source income, or whether dividends from active
income can be repatriated tax free. Those issues, while important for
other purposes (for example, transfer pricing or the "lock out" effect),
are in our view irrelevant to the competitiveness issue.
ing-papers/WP0926.pdf (limiting analysis to U.S. multinationals). The Swenson and Lee
and Markle and Shackleford studies discussed below focus on ETRs of countries, although
they base that on studying the financial data of multinational enterprises from those coun-
tries. See note 14 and accompanying text.
12 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Effective Tax Rates 1 (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.
businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/EffectiveTax-RateStudy.pdf.
13 Id. at 3 tbl.1; see notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
14 Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A. Shackleford, Cross-Country Comparisons of Corpo-
rate Income Tax Rates 1 (NBER, Working Paper No. 16839, Feb. 2011), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w16839 (finding, in a study of 11,602 public corporations from
eighty-two countries for 1988-2009, Japanese firms always faced the highest ETRs);
Charles Swenson & Namryoung Lee, The Jury Is In: US Companies Are Overtaxed Rela-
tive to Their International Competitors, AICPA Tax Insider Newsletter (July 17, 2008),
http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/Producer-Content/Newsetters/Articles-2008/Tax/
Juryin.jsp (noting Japanese median ETR for 2006-2007 was 41%).
15 The Forbes 2000 list for 2011 includes 536 U.S. companies. The World's Biggest Pub-
lic Companies, Forbes.com (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/global2000/; see Scott
DeCarlo, A Regional Look at the Forbes Global 2000, Forbes.com (Apr. 20, 2011),
www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/2011/04/20/a-regional-look-at-the-forbes-global-2000-2/.
The top 100 (19%) account for 57% of the revenues and 77% of the profits of those com-
panies, see The World's Biggest Public Companies, supra, suggesting that to study competi-
tiveness we should focus on these companies.
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II. METHODOLOGY
To find the 100 biggest U.S. companies and the 100 biggest Euro-
pean companies, we used the list of Forbes 2000 biggest public compa-
nies for 2011, as published in Forbes magazine's website. 16 We then
constructed our database by choosing the most highly ranked U.S. and
European companies respectively. The list of the 200 chosen compa-
nies is presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.
We then searched the Compustat database (both North America
and Global) to find financial data of the chosen companies.' 7 For
every company in our list, we found the pretax income, net income,
and current income tax for fiscal years 2001 to 2010. Because fiscal
years of different companies end at different dates, we grouped fiscal
years if they ended between July 1 of a certain year and June 30 of the
following year. For example, for fiscal year 2005 we included all fiscal
years that ended between July 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005.
If, for some reason, a certain company did not have any financial
data available on the Compustat database for all fiscal years men-
tioned, we did not include it in our database and replaced it by the
next highest ranked company on the Forbes 2000 list. We then trans-
lated all financial data into U.S. dollars using annual exchange rates
taken from the OANDA website.18 At the end of this process, we
obtained a database of 200 companies (100 U.S. companies and 100
European companies) with at least one year of financial data between
2001 and 2010. Table 3 in the Appendix describes the distribution of
companies by country of residence.
Comparing the ETRs in each region (Europe and the United
States), we calculated aggregate effective tax rate (AETR) as follows:
AETRi,, 
=-
xJPIj,I
where is the AETR of region i during period t. The numerator is the
sum of all current income taxes booked by the companies residing in
region i during period t, and the denominator is the sum of all pretax
income paid earned by the companies residing in region i during the
same period. Naturally, the Compustat database may not have the
relevant data to calculate this measure for all companies during all
fiscal years. For this reason, we only used available data that can be
found either directly (that is, both pretax income and current income
16 The World's Biggest Public Companies, note 15.
17 Compustat is an online database that provides financial, market, and other statistical
information on companies throughout the world. See www.compustat.com.
18 See www.oanda.com/currency/converter.
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tax are available) or indirectly (that is, either pretax income or current
income tax can be found by adding current and deferred income tax to
net income or subtracting deferred income tax and net income from
pretax income respectively).
The AETR is therefore a measure of the ETR paid by the business
sector in every region. Our decision to use aggregate measures in our
study is a result of (what we see as) a bias that can occur when using
some kind of average (either weighted or not) of ETRs of individual
companies. This bias is more significant when companies have a rela-
tively low (or even negative) pretax income. When this is the case, all
deviation from the current (say, 35% in the case of U.S. companies)
tax provision may strongly affect the ETR. Assume, for example, two
companies, Company A and Company B. Both companies' revenues
in a given year equal $1 million. The pretax profits, however, are dif-
ferent and equal $100,000 and $10,000 respectively. If both pay 35%
of pretax income as income tax, then the average ETR is 35%. As-
sume now that there is a tax adjustment to Company A in the amount
of $2000. This adjustment will change Company A's ETR by approxi-
mately 6% (from 35% to 33%). If, however, the same adjustment was
made to Company B, its ETR would change by approximately 57%
(from 35% to 15%). This difference would also affect an average
ETR if weighted by revenues. If the adjustment was made to Com-
pany A, the new average ETR would be 34%. If, on the other hand,
the adjustment was made to Company B, the new average ETR would
be 25%. A similar example can show biased calculations when the
average ETR is weighted by any variables other than pretax profit.
Several ways are used in the literature to avoid this bias. One way
(used in the PricewaterhouseCoopers study) is to eliminate outliers. 19
It is reasonable to assume that relatively low (or negative) pretax in-
come generates either too high or too low (or negative) ETRs.20 For
this reason, in cases where either a too high or a too low ETR is de-
tected, the observation is eliminated. It is our view, however, that
outliers in this context are part of the data. Furthermore, when the
AETR is calculated using our method, relatively low pretax income
and relatively low income tax will have relatively low effect on the
measure. A tax credit to a company with low or negative pretax in-
come is not an outlier. Therefore it should be treated the way it is:
part of the total income tax collected by the tax authority during the
testing period.
To illustrate the crucial effect of outliers on the accuracy of the re-
sults, we present the case of Boeing in fiscal year 2003. During this
19 PricewaterhouseCoopers, note 12, at 1.
20 See id.
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year, Boeing earned a pretax profit of $550 million, with an ETR of
negative 315% !21 A study such as that produced by Price-
waterhouseCoopers would exclude Boeing's fiscal year 2003 on this
basis.22 Investigating the reason for this abnormal ETR, however, we
find that Boeing's total corporate tax was negative $168 million. 23 A
part of this amount, however, is an audit settlement in the amount of
$456 million paid to Boeing this year.24 We consider this settlement as
a reduction from the tax revenues collected by the IRS. This revenue
reduction must be taken into account when AETRs are compared.
An exclusion of this amount would result in biased measurement of
aggregate corporate taxes and, hence, AETRs.
In other cases, it is possible that such an elimination process will
result with keeping the outliers. To illustrate this, consider the above
example and assume that the researcher chooses to exclude compa-
nies with nonpositive ETRs. Assume now that Company A received a
tax credit of $20,000 and Company B received a tax credit of $3500.
The researcher will exclude Company B because of a dismissible tax
adjustment, where Company A will still be part of the data with a
much bigger tax adjustment. In sum, excluding outliers does not en-
sure the isolation of companies with reasonable ETRs on the one
hand, and does not provide accurate results on the other hand.
Another way is to aggregate data across periods. If a certain com-
pany showed an abnormal ETR in a certain year, then aggregating
income taxes over several years should dismiss small or insignificant
deviations from standard tax rate levels. For this reason, in addition
to annual analysis, we also provide results across ten years of study.
Ill. RESULTS
AETR values of each region are presented in Table 1 for different
fiscal years and for the last decade. The table shows that in eight of
ten years, the annual European AETR is higher than the annual U.S.
AETR. In addition, the European AETR is also higher for the period
from 2001 to 2010.
21 See Boeing Co., 2003 Annual Report 25 (2003), available at http://www.boeing.com/
companyoffices/financial/finreports/annua/03annualreport/boeing-03ar.pdf.
22 PricewaterhouseCoopers, note 12, at 1.
23 Boeing Co., note 21, at 25.
24 Id. at 63.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 65:
2012] TAX RATES OF THE LARGEST U.S. AND EU MULTINATIONALS 381
TABLE 1
AETR FOR EACH REGION BY YEAR
Revenue
Year Europe U.S. Ratio
2 5
(U.S./EU)
2001 39% 33% 1.19
2002 49% 32% 1.06
2003 34% 24% 0.99
2004 31% 27% 1.02
2005 34% 30% 1.20
2006 32% 31% 1.16
2007 31% 32% 1.25
2008 46% 56% 1.22
2009 37% 30% 1.21
2010 31% 24% 1.25
2001-2010 35% 31% 1.16
IV. DISCUSSION
Our results are the opposite from those found in the Price-
waterhouseCoopers study, even though that study used the same
methodology (that is, calculated AETR as aggregate income tax di-
vided by aggregate pretax income). 26 In our opinion, however, the
PricewaterhouseCoopers study is flawed and should not be taken as
an indication that U.S.-based multinationals are subject to a higher
AETR than their counterparts from other countries. The reasons for
this conclusion are as follows:
(1) PricewaterhouseCoopers used all 2000 companies in the Forbes
Global database, 27 while we used only the largest 200 (100 U.S. and
100 EU). As explained above, in our opinion focusing on the largest
companies is more closely related to competitiveness.
(2) PricewaterhouseCoopers calculated results only for the period
from 2006 to 2009,28 while we calculated between 2001 and 2010. In-
cluding a longer time frame improves the reliability of our results.
(3) PricewaterhouseCoopers compared U.S. companies to those
from fifty-eight other countries, not to European companies as a
group (although they did compare the United States to OECD coun-
tries). 29 We used the biggest 100 U.S. and biggest 100 European com-
panies. In our opinion this method is more relevant to the
25 Revenue Ratio is the ratio of total U.S. revenues to total European revenues. It can
be regarded as a measure of business volume.
26 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, note 12, at 1, 5 tbl.2.
27 Id. at 1.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1-2.
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competitiveness question because the PricewaterhouseCoopers study
includes many companies from small countries that do not provide
serious competition to large U.S. multinationals (for example,
Morocco) .30
(4) PricewaterhouseCoopers eliminated outliers, 31 while we did
not. As explained above, outliers can have an important impact on
the results and there is no reason to assume they are irrelevant in this
context. By eliminating outliers, PricewaterhouseCoopers limited
themselves to conventional cases only (that is, only to those compa-
nies with an ETR in the 20% to 40% range). In our opinion, this
analysis is all about the outliers. We are looking for the special cases
that make the difference. This is why we only include the top 100
companies from each group. In such a small number, any tax holiday
should make the difference, so it is important to include outliers.
(5) For income tax, PricewaterhouseCoopers used current income
tax and changes in deferred tax,32 while we used only current income
tax. While over a ten-year period one might expect that most de-
ferred taxes will become current taxes, in our opinion using deferred
taxes can be misleading because they just represent one accounting
firm's best guess as to whether taxes will have to be paid. For exam-
ple, under FASB Interpretation No. 48, deferred taxes have to be
booked if a transaction that avoids taxation has a 50% chance of being
upheld by the courts if challenged by the IRS, but not if it has a 51%
chance (in the opinion of the accounting firm).33 In addition, deferred
taxes may or may not include the tax on repatriations, depending on
the company's assertion that the earnings are or are not permanently
reinvested overseas, which in turn assumes that the tax law relating to
repatriations will remain unchanged. 34 In our opinion these determi-
nations are too flimsy a basis to calculate AETRs reliably. Using only
current taxes insures that the AETR reflects taxes that have actually
been paid or accrued.
(6) Table 1 of the PricewaterhouseCoopers study has a list of fifty-
nine countries that were included,35 but the appendix indicates that
only thirteen countries have more than thirty observations in each
year.36 This means that for all the rest, one cannot assume (statisti-
30 See id. at 3 tbl.l (listing the AETRs in fifty-eight foreign countries included in Price-
waterhouseCoopers study).
31 Id. at 1.
32 Id.
33 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, Inter-
pretation No. 48: An Interpretation of Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 109,
IT 6-8 (2006).
34 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, note 12, at 1.
35 Id. at 3 tbl.1.
36 See id. app. at 8-11 tbls.A-1 to A-4.
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cally) that the results properly represent the real populations. Among
these thirteen, the United States ranked number seven (right in the
middle for fiscal year 2009). In addition, the AETRs of some countries
from the fifty-nine are based on one observation, which cannot be
representative. 37
In contrast with the PricewaterhouseCoopers study, our results are
consistent with previous studies that have focused on comparing the
ETRs of various jurisdictions. 38 For example, Kevin Markle and
Douglas Shackleford compared the U.S. ETR in 2005-2009 with the
ETRs of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom
and found that the U.S. ETR was 23% while the average weighted
ETR of the other five countries was 24.5%.39 Charles Swenson and
Namryoung Lee compared ETRs in 2006 and found that the U.S.
ETR was 29.5% while the OECD weighted average ETR was
28.4%.40 For the fifteen largest countries, Swenson and Lee con-
cluded that the weighted average ETR in 2006 was 28.7% (compared
to the U.S. ETR of 29.5%).41 As Gravelle concluded, these studies all
confirm that "effective tax rates in the United States and in other
countries are similar. '42
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that this study indicates that U.S.-based multinationals
do not face a tax-induced competitive disadvantage in competing
against EU-based multinationals. Even though the U.S. statutory rate
is ten percentage points higher than the average corporate statutory
rate in the European Union, the effective U.S. corporate tax rate is
the same or lower than the effective EU corporate tax rate for the
largest U.S. and EU multinationals.
Presumably, the reason for this result is that while the EU countries
have a lower statutory rate, their tax base is larger because it has
fewer exceptions. In fact, a comparison of the controlled foreign cor-
37 See id. (determining AETRs of Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Czech Republic, among
others, with only one observation).
38 For a summary of the literature, see Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., Interna-
tional Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications 1-9 (2011), available at
http://www.assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41743-20110331.pdf.
39 Markle & Shackleford, note 14, at 42 tbl.2. This study compared ETRs of 11,602
public corporations from eighty-two countries from 1988 to 2009, id. at 1, so it is hard to
draw conclusions from it in regard to competitiveness because it includes so many compa-
nies from small countries that do not pose serious competition to U.S. multinationals.
40 Swenson & Lee, note 14, at tbl.
41 Id.
42 Gravelle, note 38, at 5. Gravelle also reports comparisons of marginal ETRs, but
those are more suspect because they rely on a hypothetical firm, rather than actual taxes
paid by real firms. See id. at 5-8.
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poration (CFC) rules of the United States (subpart F) and the major
EU jurisdictions (the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and France)
indicates that the EU CFC rules tend to be tougher than subpart F
because (1) they take into account the ETR in the source country in
deciding whether to tax income from a CFC,43 and (2) they take into
account whether the CFC has a real presence in the source country.44
Under the EU rules, for example, a bank earning interest income in a
tax haven is likely to be subject to current tax because the ETR in the
haven is low, and the bank does not have a real presence in the ha-
ven.45 Under subpart F the income will likely qualify for the active
financing exception.4 6 In addition, the European Union does not have
anything like the U.S. rules that enable U.S. multinationals to shift
profits from high-tax to low-tax CFCs without incurring a U.S. tax cost
(check-the-box and § 954(c)(6)).47
This conclusion suggests that the United States can in fact reduce its
corporate tax rate to the EU average in a revenue neutral fashion
without affecting the competitiveness of U.S.-based multinationals,
since such a move would simply result in a tax regime that is more
similar to that faced by EU companies. Specifically, as many observ-
ers have recommended, it should be possible to abolish deferral alto-
gether if the U.S. rate were reduced sufficiently. Such a move would
have tremendous simplification potential since it would be possible to
get rid of both subpart F and outbound transfer pricing enforcement,
and it would eliminate the "lock out" problem as well (since repatria-
tions would not be taxed). Alternatively, it should be possible to
amend subpart F to take the source country rate into account, so that
an effective source rate that is below 90% of the U.S. statutory rate
would result in a subpart F inclusion, while reducing the U.S. statutory
rate. Such a move, while not as radically simplifying as abolishing
deferral, will significantly reduce the pressure on outbound transfer
pricing while not resulting in a competitive disadvantage to U.S.-based
multinationals or inducing more profit shifting from the United States
to low-taxed offshore locations, like the current rules do.
43 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, A Comparison of Key Aspects of the International Tax
Systems of Major OECD and Developing Countries 7-8 (May 10, 2010), http://www.busi-
nessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/BRT 14-country-international
tax-comparison_20100510.pdf.
44 See id. at 8-9.
45 See id. at 7-9.
46 See IRC § 954(h).
47 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, note 43, at 9.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 2
THE 200 CHOSEN COMPANIES 4 8
(NUMBERS IN BILLIONS)
Forbes
2000
Ranking Company Country
1 JPMorgan Chase U.S.
2 HSBC Holdings U.K.
3 General Electric U.S.
4 ExxonMobil U.S.
5 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands
8 Berkshire Hathaway U.S.
10 Citigroup U.S.
11 Wells Fargo U.S.
11 BNP Paribas France
13 Banco Santander Spain
14 AT&T U.S.
16 Chevron U.S.
18 Wal-Mart Stores U.S.
19 Total France
20 Allianz Germany
22 ConocoPhillips U.S.
24 Volkswagen Group Germany
26 Nestld Switzerland
27 Vodafone U.K.
28 ENI Italy
29 American Intl Group U.S.
29 GDF Suez France
31 IBM U.S.
31 Telef6nica Spain
35 Procter & Gamble U.S.
36 Pfizer U.S.
37 Goldman Sachs U.S.
Group
38 E.ON Germany
39 ING Group Netherlands
40 UBS Switzerland
41 Barclays U.K.
42 Hewlett-Packard U.S.
43 Daimler Germany
44 Soci6td G~n~rale France
45 Siemens Germany
47 Apple U.S.
48 AXA Group France
50 Microsoft U.S.
54 Ford Motor U.S.
55 ENEL Italy
57 Johnson & Johnson U.S.
58 Rio Tinto U.K.
59 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland
60 Statoil Norway
62 DeutscheBank Germany
62 Novartis Switzerland
Sales
$115.5
103.3
150.2
341.6
369.1
136.2
111.5
93.2
130.4
109.7
124.3
189.6
421.8
188.1
142.9
175.8
168.3
112.0
67.5
130.5
77.3
113.1
99.9
81.3
79.6
67.8
46.0
124.6
149.2
49.8
63.9
127.2
130.9
85.4
103.5
76.3
162.4
66.7
129.0
96.5
61.6
56.6
53.9
90.4
61.2
50.6
Profits
$17.4
13.3
11.6
30.5
20.1
13.0
10.6
12.4
10.5
12.8
19.9
19.0
16.4
14.2
6.7
11.4
9.1
36.7
13.1
8.4
7.8
6.2
14.8
13.6
11.2
8.3
8.4
7.9
4.3
7.7
5.6
9.1
6.0
5.3
5.3
16.6
3.7
20.6
6.6
5.9
13.3
14.3
5.2
6.5
3.1
9.8
Market
Assets Value
$2117.6 $182.2
2467.9 186.5
751.2 216.2
302.5 407.2
317.2 212.9
372.2 211.0
1913.9 132.8
1258.1 170.6
2680.7 88.0
1570.6 94.7
268.5 168.2
184.8 200.6
180.7 187.3
192.8 138.0
838.4 62.7
156.3 109.1
267.5 70.3
117.7 181.1
236.6 148.2
176.1 96.8
683.4 67.1
245.5 85.2
113.4 198.1
166.5 113.3
134.3 172.2
195.0 155.7
911.3 90.0
205.1 64.0
1665.3 46.8
1403.0 70.8
2328.3 58.3
119.9 90.3
178.7 70.5
1518.7 46.9
135.0 110.2
86.7 324.3
981.8 46.4
92.3 215.8
164.7 54.3
217.4 54.0
102.9 163.3
112.4 131.6
1097.1 50.7
110.3 83.8
2556.5 59.6
123.3 125.2
48 The companies are ordered by their rank, sales, profits, assets, and market value as
published by the Forbes 2000 website. World's Biggest Public Companies, note 15.
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Forbes
2000
Ranking Company Country
64 Verizon U.S.
Communications
66 BBVA-Bancoilbao Spain
Vizcaya
72 BMW Group Germany
73 BASF Germany
74 France Telecom France
81 Morgan Stanley U.S.
81 Sanofi-aventis France
83 MetLife U.S.
86 PepsiCo U.S.
87 Cisco Systems U.S.
89 Roche Holding Switzerland
90 ArcelorMittal Luxembourg
91 Coca-Cola U.S.
92 Deutsche Telekom Germany
93 Intel U.S.
96 Anheuser-Busch Belgium
100 EDF Group France
101 Repsol YPF Spain
101 RWE Group Germany
103 Unilever Netherlands
104 Comcast U.S.
105 Kraft Foods U.S.
106 UnitedHealth Group U.S.
107 Oracle U.S.
108 Tesco U.K.
110 Walt Disney U.S.
112 United Technologies U.S.
113 Iberdrola Spain
114 American Express U.S.
116 Prudential Financial U.S.
117 Prudential U.K.
118 Boeing U.S.
119 CVS Caremark U.S.
120 Google U.S.
125 Moller-Maersk Denmark
127 Abbott Laboratories U.S.
129 AstraZeneca U.K.
131 USancorp U.S.
133 Anglo American U.K.
134 GlaxoSmithKline U.K.
135 Aviva U.K.
138 Caterpillar U.S.
140 Dow Chemical U.S.
142 Home Depot U.S.
146 Vivendi France
147 Bayer Group Germany
149 News Corp U.S.
150 Vinci France
151 Marathon Oil U.S.
152 PNC Financial U.S.
Services
153 Philip Morris U.S.
International
154 United Parcel U.S.
Service
155 Target U.S.
158 Occidental U.S.
Petroleum
Sales
106.6
43.4
80.2
85.5
60.9
38.0
40.7
52.7
57.8
42.4
50.8
78.0
35.1
83.6
43.6
36.8
87.2
62.2
67.9
59.3
37.9
49.2
94.2
32.0
79.6
39.0
54.3
40.7
30.2
38.4
75.6
64.3
96.4
29.3
56.6
35.2
33.6
20.5
28.4
44.3
90.7
42.6
53.7
68.0
38.7
47.0
33.1
45.5
67.1
17.1
27.2
49.5
67.4
19.2
[Vol. 65:
Market
Profits Assets Value
2.5 220.0 101.3
6.3 734.1 52.3
4.3 146.1 51.0
6.1 78.2 74.2
6.5 120.5 56.7
4.7 807.7 43.8
7.3 110.3 89.2
2.8 730.9 48.4
6.3 68.2 102.6
7.6 82.0 99.2
9.3 62.9 120.9
2.9 130.9 53.6
11.8 72.9 148.7
2.3 164.6 60.7
11.5 63.2 114.5
4.1 113.8 90.6
1.4 319.9 78.2
6.2 90.4 39.6
4.4 121.7 35.4
5.7 54.8 91.9
3.6 118.5 68.7
4.1 95.3 55.4
4.6 63.1 47.7
6.8 67.2 161.2
3.5 70.1 50.5
4.4 71.0 81.5
4.4 58.5 74.8
3.8 121.0 45.0
4.1 147.0 53.2
3.2 539.9 30.7
2.2 408.3 29.4
3.3 68.6 52.7
3.4 62.2 46.5
8.5 57.9 185.8
4.7 66.5 40.5
4.6 59.5 75.0
8.1 54.8 65.6
3.3 307.8 52.2
6.6 66.4 66.2
2.5 62.1 99.2
2.3 567.9 20.5
2.7 64.0 63.9
2.3 69.6 43.0
3.3 40.1 60.9
2.9 76.7 33.8
1.7 67.5 62.5
3.1 56.7 45.5
2.4 75.5 32.9
2.6 50.0 35.6
3.4 264.3 33.1
7.3 35.0 114.6
3.5 33.6 73.1
2.9 43.7 35.7
4.5 52.4 80.3
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Forbes
2000 Market
Ranking Company Country Sales Profits Assets Value
159 British Amer. U.K. 23.2 4.5 43.0 76.6
Tobacco
161 Nokia Finland 56.8 2.5 50.3 31.2
162 Renault France 52.2 4.6 93.1 16.7
163 Time Warner U.S. 26.9 2.6 66.5 39.7
166 Travelers Cos U.S. 25.1 3.2 105.2 25.4
167 WellPoint U.S. 58.8 2.9 50.2 25.5
168 Deutsche Post Germany 68.3 3.4 50.5 21.7
170 Merck & Co U.S. 46.0 861.0 M 105.8 100.9
173 El du Pont de U.S. 32.7 3.0 40.4 48.8
Nemours
174 BG Group U.K. 17.4 3.4 50.0 79.2
176 Bank of New York U.S. 14.5 2.5 247.3 36.0
Mellon
181 McDonald's U.S. 24.1 4.9 32.0 80.1
182 Dell U.S. 61.5 2.6 38.6 29.5
183 Aegon Netherlands 42.4 2.4 445.8 14.2
184 Capital One U.S. 19.1 2.7 197.5 22.7
Financial
188 Aflac U.S. 20.7 2.3 101.0 26.1
190 3M U.S. 26.7 4.1 30.2 65.2
192 Lockheed Martin U.S. 45.8 2.9 35.1 28.2
193 L'Or6al Group France 26.1 3.0 31.4 67.9
194 Honeywell U.S. 33.4 2.0 37.8 44.1
International
195 Volvo Group Sweden 39.4 1.6 45.5 34.8
196 Schneider Electric France 26.2 2.3 40.3 43.3
196 National Grid U.K. 20.7 2.1 66.1 32.0
198 Archer Daniels U.S. 68.6 1.9 42.6 23.0
199 Lowe's Cos U.S. 48.8 2.0 33.7 36.5
200 Deere & Co U.S. 27.3 2.1 42.9 37.0
201 Amgen U.S. 15.1 4.6 43.5 49.9
204 Imperial Tobacco U.K. 23.6 2.4 48.0 32.2
Group
206 Walgreen U.S. 68.4 2.2 27.0 38.7
207 Eli Lilly & Co U.S. 23.1 5.1 31.0 40.4
208 Altria Group U.S. 16.9 3.9 37.4 52.4
210 Philips Netherlands 34.0 1.9 41.5 30.4
211 Union Pacific U.S. 17.0 2.8 43.1 46.5
215 Ericsson Sweden 30.3 1.7 40.0 40.0
216 Exelon U.S. 18.6 2.6 52.2 28.6
216 Christian Dior France 28.3 1.7 55.3 25.7
218 Danone France 22.8 2.5 35.9 39.7
222 Freeport Copper U.S. 19.0 4.3 29.4 46.8
222 ACE Switzerland 16.0 3.1 83.4 20.6
224 General Dynamics U.S. 32.5 2.6 32.5 28.4
225 Southern Co U.S. 17.5 2.0 55.0 32.4
225 Metro AG Germany 90.2 1.1 47.0 23.0
227 Centrica U.K. 35.0 3.0 29.8 27.4
229 Hess U.S. 33.9 2.1 35.4 27.1
231 Bristol-Myers Squibb U.S. 19.5 3.1 31.1 45.0
235 ThyssenKrupp Germany 58.1 1.1 58.9 20.0
Group
238 TeliaSonera Sweden 15.9 3.2 35.9 38.2
241 EADS Netherlands 60.7 733.6 M 111.2 22.0
242 Apache U.S. 12.1 3.0 43.4 45.5
245 Carrefour Group France 120.6 579.7 M 70.9 31.2
246 Costco Wholesale U.S. 82.0 1.4 25.7 31.7
247 Medtronic U.S. 15.8 3.3 30.6 40.7
248 SAP Germany 16.7 2.4 27.8 71.9
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Forbes
2000
Ranking Company Country Sales
250 BT Group U.K. 31.7
252 Qualcomm U.S. 11.7
254 Dominion Resources U.S. 15.2
255 EMC U.S. 17.0
258 Hartford Fin'l Svcs. U.S. 22.4
260 Bouygues France 41.8
264 Allstate U.S. 31.4
267 NextEra Energy U.S. 15.3
269 Gas Natural Group Spain 26.3
271 Holcim Switzerland 23.2
272 Northrop Grumman U.S. 34.8
275 Air Liquide France 18.1
276 Diageo U.K. 14.6
278 Emerson Electric U.S. 21.7
279 McKesson U.S. 109.9
281 Johnson Controls U.S. 35.4
282 FedEx U.S. 38.2
282 BlackRock U.S. 8.6
284 BAE Systems U.K. 32.9
286 Time Warner Cable U.S. 18.9
290 Duke Energy U.S. 14.3
291 Telenor Norway 16.3
292 Devon Energy U.S. 9.9
298 State Street U.S. 9.7
302 Amazon.com U.S. 34.2
303 Aetna U.S. 34.2
304 Scottish & Southern U.K. 32.7
305 Linde Germany 17.3
307 Peugeot France 75.0
307 Veolia France 46.6
Environnement
309 EnBW-Energieaden Germany 23.4
312 Chubb U.S. 13.3
313 Loews U.S. 14.6
314 Lafarge France 21.6
319 Danskeank Group Denmark 21.7
320 Alstom France 26.6
326 EDP-Energias de Portugal 19.0
Portugal
336 PPR France 19.6
341 Reckittenckiser U.K. 13.2
Group
343 KoN Holding Turkey 35.9
346 Henkel Group Germany 20.2
352 CEZ Czech 10.6
358 Fiat Group
363 OMV Group
376 Ferrovial
378 Continental
381 Areva
Republic
Italy
Austria
Spain
Germany
France
[Vol. 65:
Profits
1.6
3.6
2.8
1.9
1.7
1.4
928.0 M
2.0
1.6
1.3
2.1
1.9
2.4
2.2
1.1
1.5
1.3
2.1
1.6
1.3
1.3
2.5
4.6
1.6
1.2
1.8
1.9
1.3
1.5
777.9 M
1.6
2.2
1.3
1.1
657.0 M
1.6
1.4
Assets
40.2
31.3
42.8
30.8
318.3
47.4
130.9
53.0
59.5
47.1
31.4
30.2
28.3
22.7
30.4
26.0
26.2
178.5
35.8
45.8
59.1
29.4
32.9
160.5
18.8
37.7
27.3
36.1
91.2
66.7
47.2
50.2
76.3
56.4
578.3
33.8
53.7
Market
Value
23.4
88.1
26.4
55.0
12.3
16.5
16.9
23.4
15.4
23.4
19.3
36.1
47.3
44.8
19.8
27.6
28.6
25.0
17.5
23.6
24.5
26.7
37.6
21.8
75.8
14.0
17.9
25.8
8.7
15.0
14.4
17.4
17.4
16.7
15.6
15.9
13.9
1.3 32.4 19.0
2.4 20.7 36.2
1.2
1.5
2.5
696.1 M
1.2
2.9
771.1 M
1.2
52.5 10.8
23.0 24.4
29.0 24.6
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TABLE 3
THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES BY COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Country
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Total
Count of Company
1
1
1
2
1
24
193
1
6
2
1
7
3
7
1
20
100
200
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